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NOTE
Regulation Of Environmental Marketing:
Reassessing The Supreme Court's Protection Of
Commercial Speech
I. INTRODUCTION
"'Millions have come to Yellowstone,' the voice-over says, 'and
for over seventy-five years when they arrived, they filled up with a
gasoline developed by Conoco, a company committed to protect-
ing the environment. Maybe that's why Conoco has always been
the hottest brand going, and the only gasoline sold in National
Yellowstone Park.'"' America has discovered the environment, and
companies hope to profit. Claims like the one above have sparked
calls for government action to protect consumers from fraudulent
claims and to encourage businesses to make real changes in their
products to benefit the environment. However, amidst state and
federal efforts to achieve these goals, the First Amendment seems
to have been forgotten.
But in 1993, the Supreme Court decided three cases involving
commercial speech: Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,2 United States v.
Edge Broadcasting,' and Edenfield v. Fane.4 Characteristically, the
decisions have left much uncertainty concerning First Amendment
protection of commercial speech. Discovery Network and Edenfield
purportedly raised the level of protection accorded commercial
speech; later, however, Edge Broadcasting apparently withdrew this
protection. This incongruity reflects the checkered history of the
Court's commercial speech jurisprudence. Commercial speech
encompasses all types of advertising, some of which have received
special treatment by the Court. Therefore, attempts to reconcile
conflicting results often prove futile. Nevertheless, the 1993 Court
1 Bob Garfield, If this is the Revolution, Bring Back the Old Guard, ADVERTISING AGE,
June 28, 1993, at 53.
2 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
3 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
4 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
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has reasserted principles emphasized throughout commercial
speech jurisprudence that will guide its analysis of any future case.
This Note will review the modem commercial speech doc-
trine, analyze the Court's recent decisions,, and determine whether
state environmental statutes which regulate the use of common
environmental terms pass constitutional scrutiny. The issue will
likely see more litigation. Six states have passed such laws and
California's is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.5 Part II of
this Note reviews federal and state efforts to remedy the problems
caused by increased environmental claims. Part III studies the
founding and development of the modem commercial speech
doctrine. Drawing common principles from such a divergent array
of case law can often hide important nuances in the Court's analy-
sis. However, the cases are categorized to demonstrate both key
variables in this analysis, and highlight trends in the Court's treat-
ment of commercial speech. Both are essential to understand the
significance of the Court's 1993 opinions, which are analyzed in
Part IV. Finally, Part V applies these new developments to the
contested California statute. This Note argues that the 1993 Court
raised commercial speech to a level of protection that would likely
require courts to strike down many state environmental statutes.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE EFFORTS TO REGULATE
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING
Responding to greater consumer awareness of the impact
products and services have on the environment, companies have
increasingly made environmental claims about their products in
recent years to boost sales.6 Federal and state governments have
responded to remedy two problems created by this type of adver-
tising. First, businesses often make false or misleading environmen-
tal claims. Second, governments hope to improve the environment
by giving incentives to businesses to meet consumer demand for
environmentally friendly products.7 Thus far, federal and state
governments have utilized two methods to achieve these goals: (1)
prosecuting individual cases of misleading advertisements and
5 Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal.
1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. July 23, 1993).
6 See Jennifer Lawrence, Green Products Sprouting Again; More Focused Efforts Avoid
Controversy, ADVERTISING AGE, May 10, 1993, at 12.
7 See, e.g., Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 756 (citing California's asserted interests in
.ensuring truthful environmental advertising and encouraging recycling and environmen-
tally sound packaging" as substantial).
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using these case precedents to set standards, and (2) regulating
the use of environmental terms. The second method presents First
Amendment concerns.
A. Case-by-Case Enforcement Against Misleading Claims
The federal government preferred to combat false environ-
mental claims by prosecuting cases to set standards." But in 1992,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) passed non-binding
guidelines at the request of states and companies.' The guidelines
provide general principles for businesses to follow and give specific
examples of marketing claims that would be considered suspect.
Corporations are not bound by the guidelines. The FTC promul-
gated them only in response to the demands of many corporations
frustrated by state suits for misleading environmental claims they
thought legitimte. ° Under the Bush administration, the FTC
and the EPA largely rejected the pleas of environmental advocates
and some state attorney generals to adopt binding regulations un-
der which companies could be held liable." However, these par-
8 See, e.g., FTC Rules and Guides-Enforcement Activities: Prepared Remarks of The Honor-
able Deborah K Owen, Commissioner, FTC FTC TODAY, Sept. 21, 1993 (highlighting the
FTC's recent prosecution of companies allegedly using terms such as "environmentally
friendly" unfairly); FTC Seeks Early Role in EPA Environmental Advertisement Claims Regula-
tions, FTC: WATCH (Wash. Regulatory Reporting Assoc., Washington, D.C.), March 23,
1992, available in LEXIS, Trade Library, FTCWAT File (FTC supporting federal legislation
because it is "consistent with the Commission's case-by-case enforcement approach to
environmental marketing claims"). See also Green Hearings: Everyone Loves Guides; Advertising
Groups Move to Prevent Enforcement Balkanization, FTC: WATCH (Wash. Regulatory Reporting
Assoc., Washington, D.C.), July 29, 1991.
9 16 C.F.R. § 260 (1992). These guidelines were made pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45
(§ 5 of the FTC Act), which prohibits unfair methods of competition. The guidelines are
to be applied specifically to environmental claims made in connection with sales or mar-
keting of a product. They do not preempt state or federal law and do not have the
force of administrative regulations.
10 See, e.g., Jennifer Lawrence, Mobi4" With the Introduction of the Degradable Hefty Trash
Bag In June 1989, Mobil Thought It Had Addressed a Growing Retail Complaint ADVERTISING
AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 12. This case study of Mobil Chemical Company's degradable plas-
tic garbage bag litigation highlights this frustration. See infra note 181.
The FrC was accused of being too lethargic in not acting sooner to promulgate
regulations or take some action. The guidelines were made only after corporations facing
various state suits were frustrated that no national standard existed upon which they
could rely. See Edward B. Cohen & William I. Rothbard, Reauthorizing the FTC Back into
the Future, LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 29.
11 See FTC Still Paralyzed Over Guidelines for 'Green' Advertisement Claims, FTC: WATCH
(Wash. Regulatory Reporting Assoc., Washington, D.C.), July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Trade Library, FrCWAT File. See also Environmental Advertisement Claims, FTC: WATCH
(Wash. Regulatory Reporting Assoc., Washington, D.C.), May 4, 1992.
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ties gained some success in lobbying Congress, where such statuto-
ry definitions have been proposed." There is still substantial evi-
dence of support for such legislation and criticism of the case-by-
case enforcement approach."3
B. Regulation of Environmental Terms
In response to perceived federal inaction, states began to act.
First, ten states 4 wrote and endorsed The Green Report, which
sought to assess the environmental marketing problem and rec-
ommend solutions. 5 The Green Report recognized that the increase
in environmental claims was causing consumer confusion because
common -terms like "biodegradable" and "recyclable" have no
clear, uniform meaning. 6 Moreover, "the science involved in un-
derstanding the environmental issues underlying these claims is
complicated and the related technologies associated with environ-
12 See H.R. 3865, 102d Congress, 2d Sess. (1991). The National Waste Reduction,
Recycling, and Management Act was proposed by Senator Lautenberg but failed to pass.
The Act required the EPA to promulgate regulations for marketing claims in order to
.reduce negative environmental impacts and improve environmental attributes." Id. at 50.
It also delineated specific requirements that these regulations must have regarding certain
terms. Under this Act, the FTC's only role was to enforce the regulations once enacted
by the EPA. See also HOWARD BEALES & TIMOTHY J. MURIS, STATE AND FEDERAL REGULA-
TION OF NATIONAL ADVERTISING 97 (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL ADVERTISING].
13 See, e.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and the Future of Environmental
Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147 (1991); Thomas C. Downs, Comment, "Environmentally
Friendly" Product Advertising. Its Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
155 (1992); Glenn Israel, Note, Taming the Green Marketing Monster:. National Standards for
Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303 (1993); Todd A. Rathe,
Note, The Gray Area of the Green Market: Is it Really Environmentally Friendly? Solutions to
Confusion Caused by Environmental Advertising, 17 J. CORP. L. 419 (1992). Very few have
argued for the case-by-case enforcement method. But see NATIONAL ADVERTISING, spra
note 12, at 111.
14 They are California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. In May, 1991, the GREEN REPORT II was published
which made some changes to the original recommendations of the Task Force in light of
some criticisms that the original recommendations were "untenable, unfair, or ill-advised."
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AD Hoc TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
ADVERTISING, THE GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
ADVERTISING, at vi [hereinafter GREEN REPORT II]. Tennessee joined the original ten
states in the GREEN REPORT II.
15 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AD Hoc TASK FORCE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL ADVERTISING, THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING, at 2-3 [hereinafter GREEN REPORT]. This
report may be obtained by contacting the Offices of the Attorney General of the partici-
pating states.
16 Id. at 13.
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mental management are undergoing rapid change." 7 The partici-
pating states recommended some form of government action to
prevent a number of harms. 8 For example, consumers may be-
come disillusioned by misleading claims and stop taking environ-
mental considerations into account when making purchasing deci-
sions; incentives for businesses to make substantial investments in
more environmentally sound manufacturing processes and new
products would be lost if trivial or exaggerated claims are permit-
ted by competing companies; finally, the improvement in environ-
mental quality that might accrue from the manufacture and use of
environmentally safe products would be lost. 9
The Green Report reviewed a number of possible approaches to
prevent such problems, but ultimately recommended that "the
federal government adopt a national regulatory scheme establish-
ing definitions for environmental marketing claims to be used in
the labeling, packaging and promotion of products on the basis of
environmental attributes."" The Task Force proceeded to make
preliminary recommendations on which businesses could rely in
crafting environmental claims until binding national standards
were enacted. Briefly, the states recommended that environmental
claims be specific, that they should reflect current disposal op-
tions, and that they should be substantive and supported by evi-
dence of veracity.2' Within these recommendations, the Task
Force made efforts to define when terms such as "recyclable"
should be used.' The Green Report was a concerted attempt to
17 Id.
18 Id. at 14.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 20. The GREEN REPORT specifically notes, however, that "by recommending
a national regulatory scheme for environmental claims, the Task Force is not recom-
mending that states be preempted from regulating the area. Indeed, the states would
vigorously oppose any federal statute or regulation that would preempt states' rights in
the area." Id. at 20 n.11. This opposition to preemption is odd in that it conflicts with
one of the stated reasons for enacting national legislation in the first place: preventing
national retailers from having to comply with varying standards. Id. at 15-16. See also Envi-
ronmental Advertisement Enforcement, FTC: WATCH (Wash. Regulatory Reporting Assoc., Wash-
ington, D.C.), July 29, 1991.
There is recognition in the GREEN REPORT that the industry participants in the Task
Force were less than enamored with this endorsement of a federal regulatory scheme. See
the GREEN REPORT, supra note 15, at 23-24.
21 GREEN REPORT, supra note 15, at 29-46. For example, terms such as "environmen-
tally fiendly" are too vague because they incorporate value judgements on what helps
the environment. Id. at 32. Also, claims of "disposability" should not be made unless that
option is currently available in the area in which the product is sold. Id. at 38.
22 This term would be prohibited "unless the particular item is currently recycled in
1994]
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standardize claims and prompt federal action. However, some
states soon became unsatisfied with the less aggressive federal re-
sponse.
Six states enacted their own statutes regulating the use of
environmental terms.3 California's law is considered the most
stringent in the country because it establishes uniform definitions
for environmental terms and requires that parties who make broad
environmental claims maintain records which substantiate these
claims.24 Other states, such as New York and New Jersey, have
enacted emblem programs whereby a state bureau sets standards
for use of environmental terms and allows manufacturers who
meet these standards to use the state emblem on their prod-
ucts.' These states believed that by standardizing the meaning of
given terms, they would eliminate consumer confusion and any
resulting deception by businesses. 6 Moreover, by setting an ap-
propriate level for an environmental term, the state could encour-
age conservation efforts by businesses hoping to increase sales
through the use of environmental labels." However, these laws
present First Amendment problems because they regulate the use
of words irrespective of the context in which they are used.
a significant amount in the states in which the advertisement is made." Id. at 40. Other
terms such as "compostable," "biodegradable," and "photodegradable" are constrained by
similar language. Id. at 40-42.
23 They are California, Indiana, Maine, New York, New Hampshire, and Rhode Is-
land. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-
17-2(a), 24-5-17-12 (Burns Supp. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (West Supp.
1993) (repealing their prior statute and instead incorporating the FrC's guidelines (16
C.F.R. § 260) as constituting a violation of the state's Unfair Trade Practices Act); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN § 149:N (1993 Supp.) (establishing a recycling logo and defining "recy-
clable material"); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.2 (1986); RI. GEN. LAWS §§
23-18.14-1-23-18.14-6 (1993 Supp.) (defining terms on degradability of plastic containers).
24 See Rathe, supra note 13, at 441-42.
25 Id. at 443-45.
26 See GREEN REPORT, supra note 15, at 19; Association of Nat'l Advertisers v.
Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("The statute is premised on the belief
that consumers have difficulty determining the veracity of the environmental claims ad-
vertisers make concerning consumer products. Given the confusion over what advertisers
mean when they state, for example, that a product is recyclable or biodegradable, the
legislature sought to level the playing field for all advertisers by requiring that they mean
the same thing when using the terms set forth in the statute.")
27 See GREEN REPORT, supra note 15, at 20, 24.
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III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH BEFORE 1993: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST
A. Extending Protection to Commercial Speech
in Virginia Pharmacy
The Supreme Court28 explicitly extended First Amendment
protection to commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.' The Court decided
whether a Virginia statute could prohibit pharmacists from adver-
tising prescription drug prices.' Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun noted that Virginia considered pharmacists to be pro-
fessionals who affected the public health; therefore, heavy regula-
tion was a justified effort to preserve high professional stan-
dards.' Plaintiffs argued that the First Amendment entitled them
"to receive information that pharmacists wish to communicate to
them through advertising and other promotional means .... "32
Departing from its decision in Valentine v. Christensen,"5 the Court
decided to grant commercial speech First Amendment protection.
Four principles emerged from the Court's analysis.
First, the Court found that the First Amendment protects
both the interests of the listener and the speaker in the informa-
tion communicated: "If there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising .. . Second, Justice
Blackmun found that commercial information may hold value for
the consumer. Therefore, it should receive First Amendment pro-
tection like other valuable speech, unless it is demonstrated to
28 The Court first implied that commercial speech fell within the scope of First
Amendment protection in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In that case, a news-
paper editor published an advertisement of an organization located in New York which
offered services related to obtaining legal abortions in New York. Although the Court did
not "decide . .. the extent to which constitutional protection is afforded commercial
speech under all circumstances and in the face of all kinds of regulation," Justice
Blackmun stated that "the relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of
services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas." Id. at 826. Therefore,
regardless of the commercial or noncommercial label attached, the Court found that First
Amendment interests must be considered when a regulation is challenged. Id.
29 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30 Id. at 750.
31 Id. at 750-51.
32 Id. at 754.
33 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.")
34 Vnrginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757.
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have no value. 5 The prescription drug prices at issue in Virginia
Pharmacy do not lose their informational value to the consumer
simply because money is spent to project them. 6 Consequently,
states seeking to limit commercial speech must distinguish it "by its
content."7  It cannot "simply be speech on a commercial
subject. "s Commercial speech does not necessarily fall beyond
the "exposition of ideas" 9 on "truth" or "science,"40 so it too
must be protected because the consumer's interest in that message
"may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate."4
Third, the Court held that information is not harmful;
people's use, or misuse, causes the harm.42 Because "the alloca-
tion of our resources in large measure will be made through nu-
merous private economic decisions, [iit is a matter of public inter-
est that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of information is indispens-
able."43 The Court here rejected paternalistic measures which
seek to protect the public through the suppression of information.
Recognizing a legislature's concern that information, however
valuable, can be 'misused by an advertiser, the Court held that "it
is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppress-
ing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely avail-
able, that the First Amendment makes for us."4 Therefore, the
35 Id. at 771.
36 Id. at 761.
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
40 Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
41 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. One example of valuable commercial infor-
mation cited by Justice Blackmun was "a manufacturer of artificial furs promot[ing] his
product as an alternative to the extinction by his competitors of fur-bearing mammals."
See Fur Info. & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.NY.
1973). Justice Blackmun states that while not all commercial messages hold great public
interest, "there are few to which such an element ... could not be added. Our phar-
macist, for example, could cast himself as a commentator on store-to-store disparities in
drug prices, giving his own and those of a competitor as proof." Id. at 764-65.
Justice Blackmun's discussion implicates a difficult, yet unresolved, issue: defining
commercial speech and distinguishing it from noncommercial speech. See infra Part
IVAL.
42 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
43 Id. at 765. Compare infra notes 186-88, where public decisionmaking drives state
environmental regulations. There, resources are being allocated according to legislative
prerogatives, not necessarily the people's.
44 Id. at 770.
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First Amendment prefers that legislatures open channels of infor-
mation to curb these misuses rather than close them.'
Justice Blackmun concluded by caveating his support for com-
mercial speech. Commercial and noncommercial speech differ in
two respects: (1) commercial speech is more easily verifiable than
noncommercial speech; and (2) commercial speech is more dura-
ble and less likely of being chilled by government regulation.46
These distinctions "may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccu-
rate statements for fear of silencing the speaker."4" Therefore,
regulations of commercial speech may receive some form of lower
scrutiny. Justice Blackmun did not elaborate on how much defer-
ence should be given the legislature, except to suggest that "[t]hey
may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial mes-
45 Id. "There is ... an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alterna-
tive is to assume that information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them." Id.
46 Id. at 771 n.24. But see Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commer-
cial Speech?, 76 VA. L REV. 627 (1990). The authors contest both alleged differences.
First, they argue that "the objectivity [and verifiability] of commercial speech fades even
more when we get beyond old-fashioned 'We make a good product' advertising and con-
sider the way advertising is actually practiced today. What about a television commercial
that, shows a man using a particular brand of deodorant and, as an apparent result,
leading a much more vigorous social life? How could we ascertain the truth of that com-
mercial? . . . [Also,] there are many varieties of noncommercial speech that are just as
objective as paradigmatic commercial speech . . . Scientific speech is the most obvious;
much scientific expression can easily be labeled true of false, but we would be shocked
at the suggestion that it is therefore entitled to a lesser degree of protection." Id. at 635.
The comment is especially applicable to environmental advertising. See infra Part IV.A.1.
The authors further argue that even if commercial speech were more objectively verifi-
able, it should not therefore receive lesser protection: "To the extent that commercial
speech is easily susceptible to debunking by counterspeech, there seems to be less, not
more, justification for governmental interference." Id. at 636.
Regarding the durability of commercial speech, "this justification is even shakier
than the first. Much expression is engaged in for profit but nevertheless receives full first
amendment protection . .. . Film producers, book publishers, record producers-all who
engage in their chosen profession for profit-are fully protected . . . . Moreover, the
durability of speech is not purely a function of the economic interest behind it; other in-
terests can be just as strong as economics, sometimes stronger. History teaches that
speech backed by religious feeling can persist in extraordinarily hostile climates . . . . Ar-
tistic impulses can also cause expression to persist.. . ." Id. at 637.
See also David F. McGowan, Note, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 359 (1990) (arguing that commercial speech cannot be adequately defined and
should therefore be jettisoned for a pure value-based analysis). Compare Thomas H. Jack-
son and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amend-
ment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979) (arguing that Vnginia Pharmacy was wrongly decided and
that commercial speech should receive no First Amendment protection).
47 linginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
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sage appear in such a form, or include such additional information,
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being
deceptive."48 In short, the Court contemplated that legislatures
provide more information rather than less when regulating per-
ceived harms under the modern commercial speech doctrine.
Since Virginia Pharmacy, the Court has addressed a wide variety
of commercial speech cases including attorney advertising, gam-
bling advertising, and billboard regulations. An equally diverse
array of tests and factors have played a part in the development of
the modern commercial speech doctrine. The Court's 1993 deci-
sions also studied three different factual scenarios, but applied the
Central Hudson test' in each case. A brief review of these areas
will highlight principles that still inform the Court's commercial
speech analysis. For a coherent review, the cases have been placed
into three categories."0 First, the Court has addressed cases con-
cerning legal advertising."' Second, the Court studied advertising
on "vice activities," such as gambling.52 Finally, the remaining cas-
es can broadly be grouped under the heading of regulations made
pursuant to the general welfare. 5
B. Legal Advertising
Probably the most litigated area of commercial speech is attor-
ney advertising and solicitations.' The Court has heard so many
cases on the subject that it has been said "that [the category] has
48 Id. (emphasis added).
49 See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
50 These categories are primarily functional-i.e a way of organizing the case law. In
some instances, the Court has made analytic distinctions between categories which have
later been deemphasized by the Court. See, e.g., infra Part III.B. Yet some factors still
seem to play a part in outcomes. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.
51 See infra Part III.B.
52 See infra Part III.C.
53 See infra Part III.D. One final category could be added: speech which is false or
made on an illegal activity. This Note only addresses speech which is about legal activity
or speech which is only potentially deceptive.
54 See Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary Com.. 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (prohibiting lawyers
from advertising certification as trial specialist found unconstitutional); Zauderer v: Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (disciplining
attorney for soliciting business through advertisements containing nondeceptive illustra-
tions and legal advice violated First Amendment); In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (Mis-
souri Supreme Court rule regulating attorney's advertising absent proof that regulated
material was misleading violated First Amendment); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assoc., 436
U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer who engaged in in-
person solicitation of client). See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (upholding
Texas law prohibiting the practice of optometry under a trade name).
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been able to seal itself off from its roots in first amendment theo-
ry."55 However, the cases indicate that, at least since 1982, the
Central Hudson test has been applied to legal advertising as well.
Yet, the cases also recognize the existence of unique conditions by
noting: "the Central Hudson formulation must be applied to adver-
tising for professional services with the understanding that the
special characteristics of such services afford opportunities to mis-
lead and confuse that are not present when standardized products
or services are offered to the public."56 Therefore, while attorney
advertising has received greater scrutiny by the Court, the princi-
ples emphasized throughout these cases can inform our under-
standing of the analysis the Court will apply to contested
environmental statutes because they too are preventative bans on
potentially deceptive speech."
Unlike other areas of commercial speech, these cases chal-
lenged "prophylactic"s regulations of advertising deemed potential-
ly deceptive59 by the regulating body. Prophylactic regulations
"censor[] all speech on a topic regardless of the potential benefit
55 See Kozinski, supra note 46, at 630. Some support for this can be found in Justice
O'Connor's lone dissent in Edenfild v. Fang-where she argues professional services should
be treated differently. See Edenfiel4 113 S. Ct. at 1804. Moreover, Edenfield never cited
Discovery Network while nevertheless affirming many of the same principles. See infra Part
IV.B.
56 In re RM.J., 455 U.S. at 203 n.15. See also Pee 496 U.S. at 106 (utilizing the
Central Hudson test); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638 (invoking Central Hudson's factors).
57 See infra Part V.
58 The legal advertising cases have concerned blanket prohibitions on specified activi-
ties. However, it is not the complete prohibition that makes them "prophylactic." Rather,
prophylactic means "preventing or contributing to the prevention of disease" or "tending
to prevent or ward off: preventative, cautionary." See WEBSrEa's THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1818 (1986). That is, the term prophylactic seeks to describe the
rule's method, not its scope. The legal advertising regulations have been labeled as pro-
phylactic because the regulating bodies intended to prevent abusive practices in a setting
difficult to police retrospectively. Prior restraints were considered the only effective reme-
dy. Therefore, any rule that effects a precautionary silencing of parties to achieve a goal
would be considered "prophylactic" as the Court has used the term. This distinction be-
tween prohibition of all activity or speech and the prescriptive method of the ban is
further emphasized in Edenfwld. See infra note 145.
59 The parties challenging the particular bans did not advertise clearly false or mis-
leading information. Rather, the State argued that the bans should be upheld because
appellants' speech was potentially misleading. See, e.g., Pee 496 U.S. at 96 (Petitioner indi-
cated on his letterhead that he had a "Certified Civil Trial Specialist" from the National
Board of Trial Advocacy); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629 (Appellant's advertisements soliciting
business contained nondeceptive illustrations); In re RM.J., 455 U.S. at 197 (Appellant
listed courts in which he was admitted to practice in violation of a State Supreme Court
rule).
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or harmful effect of the speech."' That is, they prevent speech
or conduct irrespective of the context in which the words are
spoken or the actions performed. The Court finds two principles
dispositive when evaluating such rules.
First, states cannot assume that the potential to mislead per-
mits them to regulate as if the advertisement in fact misleads. Over
the years, the Court has required states to distinguish between
potentially and clearly deceptive speech: The First Amendment
"impos[es] on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the
truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, arid the
harmless from the harmful." 1 Excusing states from this admitted-
ly difficult task would deprive the Court of any ability to prevent
the government "from suppressing other forms of truthful and
nondeceptive advertising."62
Second, prophylactic bans on potentially misleading speech
must be the least restrictive means of achieving the state's objec-
tive. Speech with the potential to mislead can be banned only
when the state overcomes the strong presumption in favor of
60 See Howell A. Burkhalter, Comment, Advertorial Advertising and the Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 861, 882. The Court has recently spoken to the issue
of prophylactic rules and their treatment under the commercial speech doctrine in
Edenfield. See infra note 145.
61 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646. See also Peel 496 U.S. at 110 ("A State may not, howev-
er, completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading ... .") (empha-
sis added)); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 ("[W]hen the particular content or method of
the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved
that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restric-
tions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an
absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the
information also may be presented in a way which is not deceptive.") (emphasis added)
It is also important to note that the Court has considered "[t]he experience of the
FTC . . . instructive. Although that agency has not found the elimination of deceptive
uses of visual media in advertising to be a simple task, neither has it found the task an
impossible one: in many instances, the agency has succeeded in identifying and suppress-
ing visually deceptive advertising. Given the possibility of policing the use of illustrations
in advertisements on a case-by-case basis, the prophylactic approach taken by Ohio cannot
stand." Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 649 (citing as one example FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374 (1965)). Perhaps this experience is what prompted the FTC to resist insti-
tuting guidelines and instead prefer the case enforcement method. See supra notes 8-11
and accompanying text.
62 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646. "Thus, acceptance of the State's argument would be
tantamount to adoption of the principle that a State may prohibit the use of pictures or
illustrations in connection with advertising of any product or service simply on the
strength of the general argument that the visual content of advertisements may, under
some circumstances, be deceptive or manipulative. But . . . broad prophylactic rules may
not be so lightly justified if the protections afforded commercial speech are to retain
their force." Id. at 649.
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disclosure rather than concealment of information.' If the state
can eliminate the possibility of consumer confusion by requiring
more information, then it must do so.' Essentially, this is a least
restrictive means test.'
The potential for coercion of the consumer by an advertise-
ment is another factor emphasized by the Court when evaluating
the constitutionality of preventative regulations. For example, in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association," the Court upheld a ban on
in-person solicitation by lawyers largely because of the potential for
lawyers to "exert pressure and often demand[] an immediate re-
sponse, without providing the [possible client] an opportunity for
comparison or reflection."" In contrast, print advertisements,
such as those at issue in Zauderer, do not present similar coercive
circumstances.' Therefore, states will be given less latitude in
regulating them.
This line of cases provides three principles particularly rele-
vant to an analysis of laws regulating the use of environmental
terms. First, states cannot ignore the difficult task of distinguishing
potentially misleading speech from clearly deceptive ,advertise-
ments. So, although corporations can easily manipulate environ-
mental information, state laws must attempt to identify this misuse.
Second, prophylactic rules which constrain speech will face tough
judicial scrutiny; preference will be given to disclosure rather than
censorship. Environmental regulations take the opposite tack.69
Finally, advertisements made under non-coercive circumstances
63 See Peel 496 U.S. at 109-11; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 ("because disclosure require-
ments trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions
on speech, 'warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... in order to
dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion. or deception.'") (quoting In re RM.J., 455
U.S. at 201).
64 An advertisement which has the potential to mislead "does not satisfy the State's
heavy burden of justifying a categorical prohibition against the dissemination of accurate
factual information to the public." Pee 496 U.S. at 109.
65 See infra notes 85-87.
66 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
67 Id. at 457.
68 "A printed advertisement is a means of conveying information about legal services
that is more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the part of the con-
sumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney. Accordingly, the substantial interests
that justified the ban on in-person solicitation upheld in Ohralik cannot justify the disci-
pline imposed on appellant for the content of his advertisement." Zauderer, 471 U.S. at
642. See also infra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 188-91.
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probably will not merit preventative bans. Likewise, reading a
product label, environmental or otherwise, is hardly coercive.
C. Regulating "Vice Activities"
Regulations on advertising of "vice activities" such as gam-
bling, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and prostitution have been
relatively common. Only one case has recently addressed this type
of commercial speech: Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company."0
In that case, Puerto Rico placed restrictions on advertising of legal
casino gambling aimed at residents of the island." Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, upheld the law as a reasonable
constraint on commercial speech-under the Central Hudson test. A
long opponent of any First Amendment protection for commercial
speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion substantially reduced the
protection accorded commercial speech.
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the last two steps of
the Central Hudson test "basically involve a consideration of the 'fit'
between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accom-
plish those ends."72 The Court then applied the test with uncon-
ditional deference to the legislature's policy. Appellant had argued
that Puerto Rico should have required additional information
about the evils of gambling rather than suppress information
about gambling." The Chief Justice rejected this because "it is up
to the legislature to decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech'
policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino
gambling as a restriction on advertising."74 Finally, Chief Justice
Rehnquist asserted that because a State has the power to ban gam-
bling, they also have the ability to constrain advertising on gam-
bling.75
70 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
71 Id. at 330.
72 Id. at 341.
73 Id. at 344.
74 Id. But compare Vruginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24; supra note 48.
75 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345. ("In our view, the greater power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gam-
bling ... ."). In making this finding, Rehnquist juxtaposed cases considering advertising
on activity independently protected as a constitutional right. For example, in Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Court held that a state could not
prohibit the mailing of unsolicited advertisments for contraceptives. Applying the four
prong test developed by the Court in Central Hudson, the Court found not only that this
commercial speech was neither illegal nor deceptive, "but also [that it] relates to activity
which is protected from unwarranted state interference." That is, because the right to
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These assertions solidified a departure from the principles
found in Virginia Pharmacy that began in the early 1980s.76 Exten-
sive judicial deference and a "reasonable fit" test constitute no
more than rational basis review -- precisely what Rehnquist had
always argued the standard should be for commercial speech. 8
However, Rehnquist's final argument that the greater includes the
lesser has been soundly criticized.79 The extent to which it still
holds sway over the Court's analysis is unclear.' Regardless, vice
activities still receive separate treatment by the Court.8 Although
environmental labeling is not a vice activity, Posadas is relevant
because its deferential application of the final parts of Central
Hudson finds life beyond cases dealing with vice activities.
D. Regulations Pursuant to the General Welfare
Four Supreme Court cases concerned regulations made by the
state for the general welfare of the public. Although these cases
contain many characteristics of the other categories, they have
privacy encompasses reproductive freedom, information about contraception must be
accorded greater weight. Therefore: "In Carey and Bigelow, the underlying conduct that
was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally protected and could not
have been prohibited by the State. Here . . . the Puerto Rico legislature surely could
have prohibited casino gambling .... " Id.
76 See infra Part IV.D.
77 Rational basis review is partially characterized by the Court's search for a legiti-
mate legislative purpose where the legislature's intent was less than apparent. See, e.g.,
Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1798 ("Unlike rational basis review, the Central Hudson standard
does not permit us to supplant the precise interest put forward by the State with other
suppositions.") However, Rehnquist appears to do precisely this. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at
343-44. See also Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech after Posadas and Fox: A
Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931 (1992) (arguing
that the Central Hudson test as modified by Fox and Posadas is nothing more than rational
basis).
78 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Court's decision today fails to
give due deference to this subordinate position of commercial speech. The Court in so
doing returns to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45. (1905)).
79 See, eg., Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific
Expressibn and the Twilight of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1440-41 (1990).
80 See infta Part IV.C.
81 This special treatment is of particular importance to regulations on liquor or
tobacco advertising, both considered vice activities by the Court. See, e.g., M. David
LeBrun, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutes, Ordinances, or Regulations
Prohibiting or Regulating Advertising of Intoxicating Liquors, 20 A.L.R. 4th 600 (1983); David
D. Vestal, The Tobacco Advertising Debate: A Frst Amendment Perspectiv4 11 COMM. & L. 53
(1989). However, some district courts appear to have placed less emphasis on this factor
in light of the Supreme Court's 1993 cases. See, e.g., infra note 184.
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been placed here because, viewed together, they demonstrate the
historical development of the modem commercial speech doctrine.
Virginia Pharmacy found restrictions on drug price advertising un-
constitutional; Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York invalidated a ban on promotional advertis-
ing by an electric utility; Metromedia v. City of San Diego82 struck
down a municipal ordinance imposing substantial prohibitions on
billboard advertisements within San Diego; finally, Board of Trustees
of State University of New York v. Fox" evaluated a state's prohibi-
tion on company presentations in student dorm rooms." These
cases reflect the fluctuating protection accorded commercial
speech by the Court over the years.
In Central Hudson, the Court laid out a four prong test to
determine whether New York's ban on promotional advertising by
a utility violated the First Amendment. First, the commercial
speech must concern a lawful activity and not be misleading. Sec-
ond, the regulation must be supported by a substantial govern-
ment interest. Third, the law must directly advance the govern-
ment interest asserted. Finally, the regulation must be no more
extensive than necessary to accomplish the substantial state inter-
est.' Although the Court found that New York's interest in con-
serving energy was directly advanced by limiting promotional ad-
vertising,86 this interest did not justify a blanket prohibition on all
promotional advertising because "no showing had been made that
a more limited restrictidn on the content of promotional advertis-
ing woild not serve adequately the state's interests."8" Thus, un-
der Central Hudson, commercial speech was protected by a least re-
strictive means test.
However, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,' the Court
began a subtle departure from this protection. In that case, the
Court evaluated a city ordinance which sought to improve traffic
safety and city appearance by regulating billboard use in three
ways: (1) the ordinance permitted signs advertising goods or ser-
vices available on-site; (2) it prohibited signs advertising goods or
services produced or offered elsewhere; and (3) it prohibited non-
82 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
83 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
84 One final case can be added: Discovery Network. See infra Part IV.A
85 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
86 Id. at 569.
87 Id. at 570.
88 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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commercial advertising unless the advertisment fell within an artic-
ulated exception.' The Court applied the Central Hudson test and
upheld the ordinance's distinction between on-site and off-site
commercial messages." However, the prohibition of noncommer-
cial messages was ruled facially unconstitutional." Underlying this
decision was a shift in principles relied on by the Court: A
'hierarchy' of First Amendment values replaced Virginia Pharmacy's
respect for commercial information.
The Metromedia Court92 emphasized that Virginia Pharmacy did
not equate commercial and noncommercial speech. Citing Ohralik,
the Court noted that "we instead have afforded commercial speech
a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordi-
nate position in the scale of First Amendment values."93 More-
over, the Court stated that "other [lower] courts . . . have failed
to give adequate weight to the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech and to the higher level of protection
to be afforded to the latter."94 This holding shifted the Court's
focus from Justice Blackmun's Virginia Pharmacy opinion, which
emphasized the informational value and similarities between com-
mercial and noncommercial -speech for First Amendment purpos-
es.95 Because San Diego inverted the Court's hierarchy of val-
ues--giving commercial speech greater protection than noncom-
mercial speech-that part of the ordinance was invalid. 6 In con-
trast, municipalities were free to distinguish between types of com-
mercial speech (and between commercial and noncommercial
speech) because this speech fell on a "lower rung" of constitution-
al protection.97 Therefore, while the Central Hudson test was still
89 Id. at 503.
90 Id. at 508-12.
91 Id. at 513-15.
92 There is confusion over what the Court did in Metromedia. In the Sixth Circuit
opinion in Discoveiy Network, Judge Boggs stated that only a plurality found that the San
Diego ordinance regulated commercial speech. Metromedia rested on the ground that this
ordinance was a content-based restriction on noncommercial speech. See Discovery Net-
work, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464, 470 n.9 (6th Cir. 1991). Chief Justice
Rehnquist disagreed with this interpretation in his dissent in Discovey Network. See infra
note 129 and accompanying text.
93 Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456).
94 Id. at 513 n.18.
95 See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
96 Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513.
97 See id. ("[O]ur recent commercial cases have consistently accorded noncommercial
speech a greater degree of protection than commercial speech .... Although the city
may distinguish between the relative value of different categories of commercial speech,
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applied in its original form, the principles protecting commercial
speech began to disappear.
Building on Metromedia, Board of Trustees v. Fox watered down
the test itself. In Fox, the Court was faced with a challenge to a
State University of New York regulation prohibiting commercial
solicitation in student dorms.98 In remanding the case for further
proceedings,' Justice Scalia found that previous decisions of the
Court interpreted the fourth prong of Central Hudson to require
only a reasonable fit between the legislative means and ends, not
the least restrictive means."° In so doing, he provided greater
leeway for legislatures to make policy decisions on how to accom-
plish their stated objectives.' Justice Scalia also dismissed argu-
ments that this essentially made the Central Hudson test one of
rational basis review."0 Against this background of diluted princi-
ples and a watered down test, the Court addressed commercial
speech in 1993.
IV. REASSESSING COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A RETURN TO
FIRST PRINCIPLES
A. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network:
Requiring a Commercial Harm
"Motivated by its interest in the safety and attractive appear-
ance of its streets and sidewalks, the city of Cincinnati has refused
to allow respondents to distribute their commercial publications
the city does not have the same range of choice in the area of noncommercial speech
to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between, various communicative interests.")
98 In deciding whether the speech at issue was in fact "commercial" speech, Justice
Scalia briefly discussed the problem of when noncommercial and commercial messages
become "inextricably intertwined." He argued that communications can "constitute com-
mercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public
issues .... We have made clear that advertising which 'links a product to a current
political debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncom-
mercial speech." Fox, 492 U.S. at 475 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. 67-68). But see supra note
46. Justice Scalia's approach threatens to ensnare fully protected speech in a lesser stan-
dard of review. See infra Part IV.A.L.
99 Fox, 492 U.S. at 476. In this case, the Court of Appeals did not decide whether
the SUNY regulation directly advanced the State interests as required by the Central Hud-
son test. Instead, they chose to remand the case for further factual findings. The Su-
preme Court upheld this remand, but did resolve a legal issue with respect to the terms
of this remand-i.e. whether a least restrictive means test was required by the fourth
prong of Central Hudson.
100 Fox 492 U.S. at 480 (citing Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341).




through freestanding newsracks located on public property.""3
Respondents were Discovery Network and Harmon Publishing
Company, Inc. Discovery Network advertised its educational and
social programming in a free magazine published nine times a
year; Harmon Publishing distributed a free magazine advertising
real estate for sale at various locations throughout the United
States."° The Court found that Cincinnati's actions violated the
First Amendment because they "attache[d] more importance to
the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
than our cases warrant and seriously underestimate [d] the value of
commercial speech .... "105 Thus, Cindnnati v. Discovey Network
asserted that commercial and noncommercial speech held equal
value unless articulable harms could be derived from commercial
messages. In so doing, the Supreme Court came full circle from
substantial protection (Virginia Pharmacy), to nearly rational basis
review (Fox), and back to clear protection.
Two issues indicate a return to the principles articulated in
Virginia Pharmacy. First, the Court analyzed, but did not rectify, the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. Sec-
ond, the Court rejected the proposition that commercial speech
has lesser value, but instead held that commercial speech may be
subjected to heavier regulation only when it poses a unique com-
mercial harm. Based on these principles, the Court applied the
Central Hudson prongs with renewed vigor, stating clearly that in-
termediate scrutiny differs from rational review abdication.'
1. Defining Commercial Speech
The Court began its analysis of whether the Discovery
Network's publications were "commercial handbills" or newspapers
by recognizing the "difficulty of drawing bright lines that will
clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category."' Aca-
demic commentary clearly agrees.' Therefore, the Court began
by stating what does not distinguish commercial speech from non-
commercial speech: (1) whether money is spent to project it, (2)
whether the speech is carried in a publication sold for a profit,
103 Discovey Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1505.
104 Id. at 1508.
105 Id. at 1511.
106 See also infra notes 196-99.
107 Discomvy Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511.
108 See supra note 46.
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(3) whether the speech solicits money, or (4) whether the speech
is on a commercial subject."° Two definitions competed for the
Court's attention. Virginia Pharmacy's "core notion of commercial
speech-that which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction-was compared to the broader definition used in Cen-
tral Hudson: "expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience."
10
The Court opted for the narrower Virginia Pharmacy approach,
but recognized that this definition did not resolve the following
dilemma: The editorial content in Discovery Network's publications
is clearly not commercial speech under such a definition; however,
ordinary newspapers routinely carry advertisements which propose
commercial transactions.' Ultimately, the Court relied on what
they called a "common sense" difference between commercial and
noncommercial speech, but admitted that this difference was only
a "matter of degree.""2 Clearly, the Court was concerned with
the suppression of noncommercial speech under the guise of the
commercial speech doctrine. Such concern is warranted, because
both definitions focus on the intent of the speaker rather than
the nature of the speech. For example, had Discovery Network
advertised programming encouraging people to vote for the Dem-
ocratic party, the Court would likely have found that this was not
commercial speech, even though a profit could be realized
through increased viewers. Examples of the problems with the
commercial speech definition abound."' Nevertheless, the facts
109 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 (quoting VIrrginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-
62).
110 Id. at 1513 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561). The Court notes that this
broader definition was not used in Bolger or Fox; instead, the speech was closely scruti-
nized to "ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not inadver-
tently suppressed." Id.; see also supra notes 46, 98.
111 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1513.
112 Id.
113 See Kozinski, supra note 46, at 640-44. One lower court case highlights the prob-
lem. In Bloom v. O'Brien, No. 4-93-1202, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18560 (D. Minn. Dec.
30, 1993), a group of doctors sought a preliminary injunction from Minnesota's law plac-
ing a two percent tax on the gross revenues of health care providers and restricting their
ability to itemize this expense when billing patients. Recognizing Discovery Network's defini-
tion of commercial speech, the court had to admit that
[this] common sense distinction between commercial and political speech breaks
down in this case . . . .The speech involved concerns, but does not propose, a
transaction. The proscribed speech will indicate that, in conjunction with the
charges normally associated with a particular medical transaction, the consumer
must also pay a specific amount of money which will help to compensate the
health care provider for the cost the provider incurs because of the gross reve-
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before the Court were sufficient for it to assume that respondents'
publications were commercial speech for purposes of the case."4
The issue, however, has serious implications in the environmental
field, especially in light of the scientific uncertainty surrounding
any environmental claim. One Seventh Circuit case presents a
good example.
In National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. 17C, 5 an egg in-
dustry organization produced advertisements claiming that no
scientific evidence linked eating eggs to heart disease." 6 The
FTC ordered the advertisements stopped, claiming they were mis-
leading. The Seventh Circuit found the advertisement to be com-
nue tax. Because this charge is not imposed by the state on the particular trans-
action, but is a consequence of the gross revenue tax, stating the amount
charged to individual patients may well be construed as a political statement
about the law as well as a commercial statement about what is owed. Thus, the
proscribed speech may well be political.
Id. at *8-*11. The court deferred for trial a determination of whether the Minnesota stat-
ute implicated both commercial and political speech, but found that the statute failed to
satisfy the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson.
114 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1514. The Court's wavering on this' issue has pro-
vided little guidance to lower courts, leaving some to ponder whether the commercial-
noncommercial distinction still survives. For example, in Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of
Mesa, 997 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1993), billboard owners challenged city sign codes on First
Amendment grounds. While recognizing the differentiation between commercial and non-
commercial speech, the Ninth Circuit was "somewhat uneasy because of a recent footnote
comment by the Court [in Discovery Network]. [But] [a]s the comment is not a holding,
gives us no specific direction, and is apparently of insufficient importance to be in the
text of the opinion, we have no choice but to conclude that this commercial-noncommer-
cial analytical distinction still exists." Id. at 610.
The Ninth Circuit was not misreading Discovery Network. Footnote 11 hints that "if
commercial speech is entitled to 'lesser protection' only when the regulation is aimed at
either the content of the speech or the particular adverse effects stemming from that
content, it would seem to follow that a regulation that is not so directed should be eval-
uated under the standards applicable to regulations on fully protected speech, not the
more lenient standards by which we judge regulations on commercial speech." Discovery
Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.11. So, speech that is false or on an illegal activity falls be-
yond the First Amendment and gets no protection because of its content; also, speech
which has adverse effects, like gambling advertising, gets lower scrutiny. See Discovery
Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464, 470 & nn.10-11 (6th Cir. 1991). This
analysis likens the commercial speech doctrine to the regulation of adverse secondary
effects of speech. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The
commercial-noncommercial distinction would thereby be rendered useless, as this is essen-
tially a content-neutral analysis under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Many have argued that this approach would more effectively protect the consumer's inter-
est in truthful information and the State's interest in regulating adverse effects of some
commercial speech, without ensnaring fully protected speech in an intermediate standard
of review. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 46, at 651.
115 570 F.2d 157 (1977).
116 Id. at 159-60.
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mercial speech."7 Therefore, a company's differing version of
scientific facts was easily silenced because of the commercial con-
text in which it was conveyed.' Similarly, companies which ad-
vertise the beneficial environmental effects of their products could
be constrained from doing so simply because they fail to meet a
state requirement which may or may not consider all necessary
variables."' Yet "[flew free speech observers would find constitu-
tionally tolerable a widespread system of governmental suppression
of scientific opinion, even when that opinion differed dramatically
from the prevailing scientific consensus."2 ' The proliferation of
these 'advertorials' is well-documented:' "Cigarette companies
advertise that no scientifically credible evidence links smoking to
cancer. Oil companies advertise, often on the editorial page, the
dangers of particular alternative sources of energy."'n It is all
valuable speech, but arguably commercial in nature. Therefore,
the Court's reluctant reaffirmation of the commercial-noncommer-
cial distinction could be used to censor scientific evidence regard-
ing the environment
23
2. The Need for a Commercial Harm
In applying the Central Hudson test, the Court first recognized
that the city's argument rested heavily on "the proposition that
commercial speech has only a low value."' This proposition was
soundly rejected by reliance on Virginia Pharmacy. The Court noted
Justice Blackmun's original reasons for extending protection'2
and recognized that commercial speech may receive differential
117 Id. at 163.
118 See Kozinski, supra note 46, at 642 (discussing Egg Nutrition).
119 See infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
120 Redish, supra note 79, at 1443 (footnote omitted).
121 See, e.g., Burkhalter, supra note 60; Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product
Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films into Commerrial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 301
(1992) (examining whether product placement in movies constitutes commercial speech).
122 Kozinski, supra note 46, at 643.
123 There are ways of avoiding the commercial speech characterization. For example,
Phillip Morris celebrated the two hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Rights by running
television spots with prominent public figures advertising a brochure on the history of
the Bill of Rights. Although cigarette advertising is banned from television, Phillip Morris
utilized an increasingly popular advertorial approach to gain access to the television mar-
ket. See Burkhalter, supra note 60, at 872. However, the Court has said that attaching a
political message to commercial speech will not necessarily heighten the scrutiny. See
supra note 98.
124 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511.
125 Id. at 1512 n.17; see also supra Part III.A.
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treatment only when it presents a definable social harm, which
Cincinnati failed to do:
The city's primary concern, as argued to us, is with the aggre-
gate number of newsracks on its streets. On thit score, howev-
er, all newsracks, regardless of whether they contain commer-
cial or noncommercial publications, are equally at fault ....
Cincinnati has not asserted an interest in preventing commercial
harms by regulating the information distributed by respondent
publishers' newsracks, which is, of course, the typical reason
why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental
regulation than noncommercial speech.116
Because no harm could be tied to the commercial nature of the
publications, Cincinnati had no right to distinguish between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech.
1 7
Therefore, commercial speech appears to be accorded equal
weight with noncommercial speech unless it is shown to inflict a
discernable harm. This principle overrules one which had gained
prominence in-the Court's jurisprudence-i.e. that commercial
speech fell on a lower rung of a First Amendment hierarchy of
values. Chief Justice Rehnquist noticed the shift." Relying on
Metromedia, the Chief Justice argued that "seven Justices were of
126 Id. at 1515 (emphasis added).
127 However, the Court notes that their decision does not preclude a state or city
from demonstrating such a difference: "Our holding, however, is narrow .... [w]e do
not reach the question whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a
community might be able to justify differential treatment of commercial and noncommer-
cial newsracks." Id. at 1516. That is, if a state can show that their regulation is directed
at a harm which happens to be presented uniquely by commercial speech as opposed to
similarly situated noncommercial speech, then the Court might be compelled to permit
such regulation. But those facts suggest that the state is not making a content-based
distinction slighting commercial speech, but rather a content-neutral determination on
how to prevent a particular harm. See infra note 130.
One lower court has already recognized that Discovery Network's requirement of a
commercial harm means that commercial speech cannot be placed on a 'lower rung.' See
Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 646 (D.N.J. 1993). In that case, a preliminary injunc-
tion was granted on an Act prohibiting delivery of a prerecorded commercial advertise-
ment, unless a live operator obtains the consent of the called party. The Act did not
require consent for delivery of noncommercial messages. Judge Ackerman found the case
analogous to Discovery Network, claiming that the "distinction between commercial and
noncommercial prerecorded messages bears no relation to the interest of protecting resi-
dents from unwarranted intrusions at home. The only arguable basis for such a distinc-
tion is the perceived 'low value' of commercial speech. However, under Discovery Network,
this is an impermissible justification for banning commercial messages." Id. at *16.
128 See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1522 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456).
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the view that San Diego's safety and esthetics interests were suffi-
cient to justify its ban of off-site billboard advertising, even though
the city's reason for regulating these billboards had nothing to do
with the content of the advertisements they displayed."" Howev-
er, the majority in Discovery Network reconciled Metromedia by claim-
ing that there the Court was endorsing a content-neutral distinc-
tion between on-site and off-site commercial advertising, not a
content-based differentiation between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech.Y
Some have argued that Discovery Network's impact may be over-
stated: "The force of this holding, however, hinges on the strength
of the required relationship" between the regulation and some
definable commercial harm." ' By refusing to delineate how
strong this relationship needs to be, "Discovery Network ultimately
may not change the actual substance of commercial speech so
much as the interests the government advances to support its regu-
lations."18 2 This analysis loses the forest in the trees. Discovery Net-
work is significant for the principles it asserts, not its application of
the Central Hudson test. Central Hudson has always been the subject
of judicial manipulations. But Discovery Network indicates that at
least five members of the Court view this test through a different
lens than previous Courts. Now, states should assume that com-
mercial speech holds equal weight with other protected
speech."3 Therefore, environmental regulations will be studied in
129 Id. at 1524-25 (citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-10).
130 Id. at 1514 n.20. The difference between content-based and content-neutral regula-
tions on speech is a crucial one. If the off-site advertisements create a significant harm,
as distinguished from on-site advertisements, then a state may remedy the situation be-
cause the regulator does not discriminate against speakers based on what they are saying.
However, the Court is suspicious of efforts to prevent harms to the consumer by making
content-based distinctions between types of speech, like commercial versus noncommercial.
See also id. at 1510 n.11, discussed supra note 114. There, the Court suggests that lower
protection may only apply when commercial speech falls beyond the First Amendment by
virtue of its content (e.g. illegal or false claims) or when adverse effects flow from that
content (e.g. gambling advertisments).
131 The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 234 (1993).
132 Id. at 231.
133 See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, Treading on Trade Talk, THE REcORDER, August 25, 1993, at
8 ("Finally, Discovery Network is as noteworthy for its celebratory tone as it is for the sub-
stance of its analysis. Any decision that quotes from historian Daniel Boorstein's THE
AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERImENT to demonstrate that commercial speech is a his-
torically important means of "[enlarging] and [enlightening] the public mind" can only
be described as a paean to commercial speech. Discovey Network may well be the single
most important decision in this area of First Amendment law since the landmark [Virgin-
ia Pharmacy]."); David 0. Stewart, Commercial Break: Supreme Court Bolsters Constitutional
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light of this value. Moreover, the impact of Discovery Network is also
evidenced by the further endorsement of its core principles in
Edenfield v. Fane.
B. Edenfleld v. Fane: Prophylactic Rules and the Potential to
Mislead
One month after Discovery Network was decided, the Court
handed commercial speech a second victory in Edenfield v.
Fane.M The case concerned Florida's ban on in-person so-
licitation by certified public accountants. Florida attempted to
justify the ban as a prophylactic rule designed to maintain the ac-
counting profession's independence, and to protect consumers
from fraud and CPA overreaching."' However, eight members of
the Court. ruled that these interests, although substantial, were not
advanced by this regulation.' The third prong of Central Hudson
requires the government to show that "its restriction will in fact
alleviate [the harm] to a material degree."'37 No empirical evi-
dence was offered to support the Board's contention that
accountant solicitations presented problems of abuse or overreach-
ing." Unlike solicitations by lawyers, CPA solicitations are
"conducive to rational and considered decisionmaking by the pro-
spective client, in sharp contrast to the 'uninformed acquiescence'
to which the accident victims in Ohralik were prone."' By
striking the regulation, Edenfield reaffirmed the principles
articulated in Discovery Network and those reflected in the Court's
jurisprudence addressing prophylactic rules on potentially
deceptive speech.
Protedions for Commercial Speech, 79 A.BA J. 42, 45 (June 1993) (According to Mark
Yurick, the assistant city solicitor who represented Cincinnati before the Supreme Court,
"the Court's ruling creates a strict scrutiny test. He stresses (as did the dissenting justic-
es) that a critical holding in the majority opinion is buttressed by citations to First
Amendment cases that involved no commercial speech.") Note that the Court also cited
noncommercial cases in Edenfleld. See infia notes 144-45.
134 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
135 Id. at 1797, 1802.
136 Id. at 1796.
137 Id. at 1800.
138 Id. at 1800-01.
139 Id. at 1803 (quoting Ohralih, 436 U.S. at 465). Thus, the Court reaffirms that the
environment in which the commercial speech occurs--i.e. whether it is potentially coer-
cive-is a factor in analyzing commercial speech restrictions. See supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text.
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First, Edenfield explained that commercial speech received
intermediate review not because it held a 'lower' value, but be-
cause "[it] is 'linked inextricably' with the commercial arrange-
ment that it proposes . . . . [T]he State's interest in regulating the
underlying transaction may give it a concomitant interest in the
expression itself."'" That is, an underlying commercial harm jus-
tifies greater government regulation, not the nature or value of
the speech. Therefore, because the commercial marketplace is "a
forum where ideas and information flourish .... the general rule
is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess
the value of the information presented."
14
1
Second, states may not justify bans on potentially deceptive
(but truthful) speech by asserting interests in protecting against
fraud. When a law prohibits truthful speech in an effort to elimi-
nate deception, it must be reasonably tailored to its objective un-
der the Central Hudson test.14 1 In short, states bear the burden of
distinguishing between potentially and actually deceptive speech;
they may not constrain the former under the guise of the lat-
ter.1
43
Finally, the Court addressed the application of prophylactic
rules to commercial speech. Prophylactic rules are not simply
blanket bans. Rather, rules are prophylactic when they prohibit
conduct or speech "at the outset, rather than punishing the mis-
conduct after it occurred."'" Reiterating its prior case law, the
Court quoted a case involving noncommercial speech, NAACP v.
Button, for the proposition that: "Broad prophylactic rules in the
area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must
be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most pre-
cious freedoms."' Button concerned solicitations that were
140 Id. at 1798 (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 & n.9 (1979); and
Ohraik, 436 U.S. at 457). Reference to the underlying transaction again invokes notions
of O'Brien content-neutral analysis hinted at in Discovery Network. See supra notes 114, 130.
141 Edenfdd, 113 S. Ct. at 1798.
142 Id. at 1799 ("But where, as with the blanket ban involved here, truthful and
nonmisleading expression will be snared along with fraudulent or deceptive commercial
speech, the State must satisfy the remainder of the Central Hudson test by demonstrating
that its restriction serves a substantial state interest and is designed in a reasonable way
to accomplish that end.")
143 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
144 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1803 (citing Ohralik facts). One justification advanced by
the Board for the solicitation ban was that it acted as a prophylactic rule. Edenfild, 113
S. Ct. at 1802. The separate assertion by the Board further indicates that not all bans
are prophylactic; only those having the purpose of preventing conduct are prophylactic.
See supra note 58.
145 Id. at 1803-04 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). In finding
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deemed political speech by the Court.146 Citation to this case fur-
ther evidences the Court's conviction that commercial speech
holds equal weight with fully protected speech and deserves strong
protection, especially against prior restraints on that speech.
C. United States v. Edge Broadcasting: Attempting to Reestablish
Rational Basis Review
Commercial speech suffered a surprising defeat in June, 1993,
when the Court handed down United States v. Edge Broadcasting.4 '
In that case, the Court was confronted with a federal statute which
sought to discourage gambling by limiting advertising of state lot-
teries by radio or television stations located in states which had no
lottery." Edge Broadcasting owned a radio station in North
Carolina, a non-lottery state, but had an audience consisting
primarily of Virginians.4 Edge argued that its First Amendment
rights were violated by the federal prohibition against advertising
the Virginia lottery over their station.?" Applying the Central
Hudson factors, the Court upheld the federal statute as a
legitimate restraint on commercial speech. Writing for the Court,
Justice White relied heavily on Posadas and Fox to revive something
akin to rational basis review."' However, several factors suggest
that Edge Broadcasting may be limited to its facts.
-prophylactic rules suspect, it is uncertain whether the Court finds blanket prohibitions on
all activity or speech problematic, or whether it finds the prior restraint, or prophylactic
nature of these regulations suspect. The Court is likely voicing its traditional concern
over the prior restraint of any speech. See 16A AM. JUR 2D, Constitutional Law, § 498
(1979) ("It is well established that freedom of speech . . . means principally . . . immu-
nity from previous restraints or censorship ... ."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1951) (constitutionality of laws imposing prior restraints is more suspect than
that of laws providing for subsequent punishment).
The above quote in Edenfield is explained by the court as the "general approach to
the use of preventative rules in the First Amendment context." Id. at 1803. In short,
prior restraint on speech, not the scope or completeness of a prohibition on any catego-
ry of speech, is suspect.
146 Button, 371 U.S. at 429.
147 113 S. Ct. 2629 (1993).
148 Id. at 2701 n.2. See 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988 ed., Supp. II).
149 Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2702. 92.2% of its listeners are Virginians, as the
station is located three miles from the state boarder. 95% of the station's revenue derives
from Virginia sources. Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 2704-06.
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1. Jumpstarting Rational Basis Review
Justice White's opinion focused on whether the final two
Central Hudson factors must directly advance the government in-
terest as applied in a particular case, or whether the regulation
need only remedy the general problem the government sought to
address. According to Justice White, the third factor should not
analyze "whether the government interest is directly advanced as
applied to a single person or entity."112  The fourth fac-
tor-whether a reasonable fit exists-is the proper place for this
consideration. However, after finding the regulation valid under
the third factor, Justice White reused the same language in his
factor four analysis: "[T]he fit in this case was a reasonable
one .... [A]pplying the restriction to a broadcaster such as Edge
directly advances the governmental interest.. . ,' Justice White
further supported his conclusion by analogizing to time, place and
manner restrictions, which he stated were "very similar to those
applicable in the commercial -speech context.""5 Under time,
place and manner analysis:
'[T]he validity of the regulation depends on the relation it
bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct,
not on the extent to which it furthers the government's inter-
est in a particular case' . . . . [T]hus . . . we judge the validity
of the restriction in this case by the relation it bears to the
general problem of accommodating the policies of both lottery
and nonlottery States, not the extent to which it furthers the
government's interest in an individual case."'
Therefore, in Justice White's mind, the statute need only bear a
relation to the overall problem, rather than concretely achieve the
end sought by the government. By interpreting the fourth prong
as an 'overall' analysis of the regulation, Justice White reapplied
152 Id. at 2704.
153 Id. at 2705 (emphasis added).
154 Id. Specifically, time, place and manner restrictions must (1) be within the power
of the government, (2) further an important or substantial government interest, (3) the
government interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the
restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The Court addressed themselves to this con-
tent-neutral test in Discovay Network, refusing to apply it because the contested regulation
was content-based. See Dicoveay Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1516 ("It is the absence of a neutral
justification for its selective ban on newsracks that prevents the city from defending its
newsrack policy as content-neutral.")
155 Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2705.
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the third factor's "directly advancing" test, but failed to subject the
statute to the further scrutiny traditionally required by the fourth
prong.156 This deferential test is not uncharacteristic of Justice
White, a long-time opponent of commercial speech protection,
which is once again evidenced in this opinion.'
2. Indications of Low Precedential Value
Two facts in Edge Broadcasting suggest the case holds limited
precedential value. First, this case presents a clear commercial
harm: advertisements on lottery gambling. As stated above, vice
activities still receive some special treatment by the Court.'1 But
the Court does not depart from its finding in Discovery Network that
commercial harm distinguishes commercial speech, not its com-
mercial character.' Second, the opinion suggests that the gov-
ernment interest involved in Edge Broadcasting-respect for differ-
ing state policies on lotteries-drove the Court's analysis and ulti-
mate conclusion." .
Justice White's opinion differentiates between the perceived
government interest and that which Congress seeks to protect:
"the[se] statutes were not 'adopted... to keep North Carolina
residents ignorant of the Virginia lottery for ignorance's sake,' but
to accommodate non-lottery states' interest in discouraging public
participation in lotteries, even as they accommodate the counter-
vailing interests of lottery states.""6 Federalism-respect for com-
peting state policies-is the substantial interest. Requiring sta-
tions to respect their local state policies on lottery gambling di-
rectly advances, and reasonably fits this federalism interest.' "
156 The fourth prong actually states that the government regulation be "no greater
than necessary." See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
157 See, e.g., Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703 ("lesser protection to commercial
speech"), 2705 ("subordinate position of commercial speech") (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at
477). Justice White's disdain for commercial speech is evidenced by his joining in the
majority opinions in Foi and Posadas, as well as his dissent with Rehnquist in Discovey
Network.
158 Edge Broadcasting 113 S. Ct. at 2703. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
But see infra note 184 for some lower court indications that this factor may be receding.
159 See supra Part IVA2.
160 Interview with Douglas Kmiec, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, in
Notre Dame, IN (Nov. 15, 1993) (discussing federalism issue intertwined with commercial
speech).
161 Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners 11).
162 This statute "was enacted 'to accommodate the operation of legally authorized
State-run lotteries consistent with continued Federal protection to the policies of non-
lottery states.'" Id. at 2701 (quoting S. REP. No. 1404, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974)).
163 Id. at 2704 ("This congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and
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When viewed in this light, it is difficult to imagine an alternative
congressional statute which could more effectively advance that
policy.
16
The dissenting opinion of Justices Stevens and Blackmun also
indicated that the Court's debate turned not on the protection to
be accorded commercial speech, but the weight and character of
congressional interest in discouraging lottery gambling. Justice
Stevens argued that this regulation is primarily a "ban on speech
imposed for the purpose of manipulating public behavior,"" not
a benign congressional effort to respect federalism. The dissent
believed the government has the "purpose of manipulating,
through ignorance, the consumer choices of some of its citi-
zens. '""tu Because these interests are not substantial, the law fails
constitutional scrutiny.'67
Therefore, although Edge Broadcasting reflects much of the
rhetoric of Fox and Posadas, the above factors suggest that only the
ardent supporters and opponents of commercial speech protection
differed here."t It is more likely that members of the Court saw
few alternatives for Congress should they invalidate the statute.
V. STATE STATUTES UNDER THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE:
A VIOLATION OF FREE SPEECH
This section will analyze the California statute under the
Court's 1993 cases.169 As discussed above, states assert two inter-
nonlottery States is the substantial government interest that satisfies Central Hudson, the
interest which the courts below did not fully appreciate. It is also the interest that is directly
served by applying the statutory restriction to all stations in North Carolina....") (em-
phasis added).
164 Nevertheless, the outcome is troubling because it seems to suggest that the "great-
er" power of States to limit gambling will permit Congress to exercise the "lesser" power
of limiting advertising on gambling. See supra note 75.
165 Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2708.
166 Id. at 2710.
167 Id. ("While a State may indeed have an interest in discouraging its citizens from
participating in state-run lotteries, it does not necessarily follow that its interest is
'substantial' enough to justify an infringement on constitutionally protected speech, espe-
cially one as draconian as the regulation at issue in this case.") (footnotes omitted).
168 Justices Blackmun and Stevens are the strongest supporters of commercial speech,
as evidenced by Stevens' majority opinion in Discovery Network and their joint dissent here.
169 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Supp. 1994) provides:
It is unlawful for any person to represent that any consumer good which it
manufactures or distributes is "ozone friendly," or any like term which connotes
that stratospheric ozone is not being depleted, "biodegradable,"
"photodegradable," "recyclable," or "recycled" unless that consumer good meets
the definitions contained in this section, or meets definitions established in trade
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ests in enacting such legislation: prevention of misleading adver-
tisements and improvement of the environment. There is little
doubt that most courts would find both interests substantial. 7 '
However, the Court's recent cases suggest that the statute may not
survive the final two prongs of the Central Hudson test.71 First,
the statute's efforts to improve the environment are suspect under
Central Hudson's third and fourth prongs. Second, the
rules adopted by the Federal Trade Commission. For purposes of this section,
the following words have the following meanings:
(a) "Ozone friendly," or any like term which connotes that stratopheric
ozone is not being depleted, means that any chemical or material released into
the environment as a result of the use or production of a product will not mi-
grate to the stratosphere and cause unnatural and accelerated deterioration of
ozone.
(b) "Biodegradable" means that a material has the proven capability to
decompose in the most common environment where the material is disposed
within one year through natural biological processes into nontoxic carbonaceous
soil, water, or carbon dioxide.
(c) "Photodegradable" means that a material has the proven capability to
decompose in the most common environment where the material is disposed
within one year through physical processes, such as exposure to heat and light,
into nontoxic carbonaceous soil, water, or carbon dioxide.
(d) "Recyclable" means that an article can be conveniently recycled, as
defined in Section 40180 of the Public Resources Code, in every county in Cali-
fornia with a population over 300,000 persons. For the purposes of this subdivi-
sion, "conveniently recycled" shall not mean that a consumer good may be recy-
cled in a convenience zone as defined in Section 1409.4 of the Public Resources
Code.
(e) "Recycled" means that an article's contents contain at least 10 percent,
by weight, postconsumer material, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 12200
of the Public Contract Code.
(f) "Consumer good" means any article which is used or bought primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes.
(g) For the purposes of this section, a wholesaler or retailer who does not
initiate a representation by advertising or by placing the representation on a
package shall not be deemed to have made the representation.
170 See, e.g., Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747, 756 (apply-
ing the second prong of Central Hudson).
171 Claims of unconstitutional vagueness or overbreadth may also be brought. The
doctrines are closely related. "An overbroad statute . . . is one that is designed to bur-
den or punish activities that are not constitutionally protected, but the statute also in-
cludes within its scope activities protected by the First Amendment." JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.8 (4th ed. 1991).
In Lungren, the court responded to this challenge by upholding the California stat-
ute under a relaxed vagueness standard in light of the lower scrutiny accorded commer-
cial speech. See Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 761-62. Similarly, the court also refused to apply
the doctrine of overbreadth because of commercial speech's lesser protection. Id. at 759.
However, in light of the Court's recent elevation of commercial speech, both challenges
could be applied to commercial speech by arguing that it too deserves protection from
the chilling effects of overbroad or vague regulations.
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government's interest in preventing deceptive advertising fails to
satisfy the fourth prong's reasonableness requirement.'7
A. Applying Central Hudson to the Government's Interest in Helping
the Environment
1. Third Prong Analysis
Central Hudson requires a court to determine whether the
challenged regulation "directly advances" in a "material way" the
government's asserted objectives. Because rapid changes in en-
vironmental science cause even experts to disagree over what prac-
tices harm or help the environment, it is unclear whether regulat-
ing environmental terms will encourage consumers and businesses
to be environmentally conscious. Examples of confusion in envi-
ronmental policy abound. Analyzing these statutes will demonstrate
that they are premised on policy decisions which cannot guarantee
results. Regulations which cannot show results fail Central Hudson's
third prong.
When the government decides to regulate the use of an envi-
ronmental term, it must make an initial policy decision on what is
best for the environment. For example, California allows "recycled"
to be used only on products which contain ten percent, by weight,
post-consumer material.' However, proposed federal legislation
required twenty-five percent post-consumer waste,'75  and New
172 Before proceeding to this analysis, it is important to note one threshold issue
studied by the Lungren court to which the Supreme Court's 1993 cases have briefly spo-
ken: the requirement that States must distinguish between potentially deceptive and actu-
ally deceptive advertising. In Lungren, defendant-intervenor argued that the commercial
speech in question was inherently misleading and therefore not protected by the First
Amendment at all. See Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 755 n.7 (citing Def. Int. Opp. at 26-29).
The court rejected this argument, finding that "a legislative body cannot justify its restric-
tions on commercial speech simply by declaring that marketing claims are misleading."
Id. at 756. EdenfieK, relying on precedent, found similarly that "where ... truthful and
nonmisleading expression will be snared along with fraudulent or deceptive commercial
speech, the State must satisfy the remainder of the Central Hudson test .... " Edenfield,
113 S. Ct. at 1799. See also supra notes 61-62. Of course, the California statute would
encompass truthful claims as well as misleading ones. Therefore, further application of
the Central Hudson test is required.
173 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
174 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(e) (West Supp. 1994). Post-consumer waste is
that which has been used by the consumer. This is to be distinguished from pre-consum-
er waste-i.e that derived from commercial uses.
175 H.R. 3865, 102nd Congress, 2d Sess. 50 (1991). The Act also provided for the
level to be raised to 50 percent by the year 2000.
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Hampshire requires fifty percent post-consumer waste."' 6 Others
argue that the distinction between pre- and post-consumer waste
should not be made at all."' Therefore, determining the appro-
priate level requires a body of scientific knowledge on what is best
for the environment. However, clear scientific proof that some-
thing helps the environment is rare.
Recently, environmental experts have focused on "life-cycle"
analysis as a method for determining what practices aid the envi-
ronment. This is best summarized as follows:
This type of analysis might be called a "cradle to grave" life
cycle analysis for a product. Our society is concerned about the
"cradle" of lost natural resources spent on overpackaging, as it
is with the "grave," i.e. the landfill or incineration cite where
disposal occurs. In a hypothetical example, the making of the
widget consumes trees, electric power, and petroleum, and
generates waste solvent; the widget is inserted into a container
made for petroleum-based laminated paper and plastic; and
residue from the widget's production is consigned to a landfill
or incinerator. Life cycle analysis measures the environmental
effects at each stage.7
Because innumerable variables are implicated in life-cycle analysis,
experts rarely agree on what course of action effectively protects
the environment. For example, the Reason Foundation, a public
policy think tank, argued that the FTC should not define the term
"recyclable" because this might imply to consumers that the FTC
encourages recycling of all products labeled in conformity with
that definition." According to them, recycling all products is
poor environmental policy because, based on life-cycle analysis,
some recyclable products do less harm to the environment when
176 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-N:2 (1993 Supp.).
177 One example is a proposed Ohio statute. See Ohio H.B. 202, 120th General As-
sembly, Reg. Sess. (1993). See also NATIONAL ADVERTISING, supra note 12, at 97-102. The
authors explain that this distinction presumes that consumers interpret "recycled" to
mean that a consumer had previously used the material and separated it out for reuse.
They find no empirical support for this presumption. The authors argue that consumers
are probably concerned about reducing consumption of natural resources (whether to
lessen the solid-waste disposal problem or for some other reason). However, reducing
consumption does not require states to distinguish between consumer and commercial
waste, but should only ascertain whether that material would have been waste but for the
recycling effort. Id. at 98-99.
178 James ,T. O'Reilly, Environmental Product Certfication: The Legal Implications of Green
Endorsements, 8 J. ENVTL. LAW & LITIGATION 199, 207 (1993).
179 See Israel, supra note 13, at 318-19, paraphrasing Hearings on Environmental Marketing
Issues Before the Federal Trade Commission, at 388-94.
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they are not recycled." Mobil Chemical Company's experiment
with degradable garbage bags highlights the policy debate and
problems underlying any environmental claim. 81 The uncertain
results derived from these policy choices present problems under
the commercial speech doctrine as informed by Edenfield.
In Edenfield, the Court required the government regulator to
bear its burden of proof under the third prong of Central Hud-
son.182 This burden "is not satisfied by mere speculation or con-
jecture.""8 In California's case, the Court would likely require
some empirical evidence demonstrating that requiring ten percent
post-consumer waste in any product labeled as "recycled" actually
increased recycling efforts (or decreased the level of solid waste
disposal) "to a material degree." 8' Unsupported claims that a
180 Id.
181 See generaly Lawrence, supra note 10. Mobil had responded to consumer demand
for degradable plastic bags even though they had concluded that biodegradable plastics
would not help solve the solid waste disposal problem. Mobil's conclusion conflicted with
the popular opinion at the time among environmental groups that degradability was the
best policy to remedy solid waste disposal problems. Mobil's "degradable" plastic bag had
qualifying language stating that the bag was degradable only when exposed to the ele-
ments. The back of the box carried a further explanation of the new feature. A year
later, the Environmental Defense Fund called for a boycott of many degradable products
because people began to realize that most garbage is sent to covered landfills where
degradability is unlikely, if not impossible. Mobil soon faced six separate state lawsuits for
misleading claims. Officials in New York and Minnesota stated that Mobil was targeted
because of its public opposition to degradability benefits.
182 EdenfieKl 113 S. Ct at 1800.
183 Id.
184 Id. Lower court interpretations of Edenfield support this argument. See Adolph
Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993). In that case, Coors challenged provi-
sions of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (27 U.S.C. §§ 201-211, 205(e)(2), (f)(2))
which prohibited statements of alcohol content on malt beverage labels. The Government
argued the regulation was designed to prevent strength wars from starting among manu-
facturers. After citing Edenfield's requirement that the government meet its burden of
proof in a niaterial way, the Tenth Circuit found that
[t]he Government relie[d] primarily on anecdotal evidence that malt beverage
manufacturers already are competing and advertising on the basis of alcohol
strength in the malt liquor sector of the market . . . . [But] [t]he critical ques-
tion is whether the evidence shows the required relationship between the label-
ing prohibition that Coors is challenging and the threat of strength wars ....
The Government simply has not shown a relationship between the publication of
such factual information and strength wars.
Id. at 358 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, governments defending environmental regula-
tions would have to show a relationship between limits on the use of environmental
terms and reduction in solid waste amounts or increases in recycling efforts.
See also 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543 (D.RI. 1993). Liquor
retailers challenged state statutes prohibiting off-premises advertising of prices at which
liquor stores sold alcoholic beverages. Judge Pettine applied Edenfield's holding to strike
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higher requirement of post-consumer waste necessarily reduces
solid waste volume may not satisfy this test.ss Even if the state
can offer empirical support, opponents of the law could utilize
life-cycle analysis to demonstrate that the statute encouraged recy-
cling which in fact damaged the environment. 8 Courts will be
placed in the position of evaluating scientific information on envi-
ronmental effects: a role which the First Amendment contemplat-
ed for consumers, not judges or legislatures. 7
Policy decisions are always made by governments. But when
environmental policy decisions are incorporated into state statutes,
there is no certainty that the environment or consumers will bene-
fit. Under Edenfield, a state's inability to muster empirical evidence
to support its substantial interests could prove fatal to environmen-
tal marketing regulations.
2. Fourth Prong Analysis
The above discussion shows that state laws regulating environ-
mental terms necessarily operate from imperfect scientific informa-
tion which continually undergoes new developments. The Green
down the statutes because "the link between alcohol price advertising and increased per-
capita consumption is not self-evident." Id. at 554. Refusing to defer to legislative judg-
ments, Judge Pettine found that the State failed to show a "direct correlation between
the price advertising ban and reduce consumption bf alcohol .. .. [T]he plaintiffs'
expert testimony demonstrates that the alcohol price advertising ban has no appreciable
impact on the levels of consumption in Rhode Island. At best, price advertising is one
factor among many that influence consumption patterns." Id. Therefore, California has a
substantial burden to fill. They must demonstrate that defining environmental terms is
not merely a factor affecting the environment, but instead is clearly connected to envi-
ronmental improvement.
Note that both cases concern a typical vice activity heavily regulated by states. Nev-
ertheless, neither court declined to apply the principles reflected in Edenfid, regardless
of the fact that it did not concern a vice activity. In light of the compartmentalized
approach the Supreme Court has historically taken towards commercial speech, these
cases suggest that commercial speech case law may be unifying behind particular princi-
ples.
185 Note, however, that California would not have to justify its 10 percent level vis-a-
vis the higher or lower levels of other states or the federal government. It need only
demonstrate that such a floor on post-consumer waste actually improved landfill problems
or increased recycling. Of course, there is no clear evidence that this is the case; rather,
the opposite may in fact be true. See infra note 195. However, the disparity in levels of
postconsumer waste required by governments (from no requirement to a 50% by weight
requirement) is further evidence of the uncertainty as to methods and results in the
field.
186 See supra notes 178-81
187 See supra note 141.
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Report has acknowledged this much."s States adopting broad stat-
utes regulating environmental terms have responded to this lack of
knowledge by limiting the amount of information available to the
consumer.8 Rather than allow corporations to make environ-
mental claims about their products (subject to case-by-case prose-
cution when those claims mislead consumers), a blanket regulation
instead prohibits environmental claims failing to comport with the
state's policy decision on what benefits the environment. The gov-
ernment-endorsed scientific theory will predominate, silencing
other (equally legitimate) theories which could be advocated by
private corporations.9 0 Thus, these states use the lack of scien-
tific certainty to regulate information and prohibit advertisements
which are not misleading. 9' California's law is a prime example
of this approach.
In contrast, the Supreme Court views information as valuable,
tainted only by how people use it.92 California must therefore
demonstrate that consumer knowledge about a product's impact
on the environment makes improving the environment more diffi-
cult. An example used by the Lungren court illustrates the argu-
ment:
the claim that a product is 'biodegradable, if composted' might
be truthful, but if the product is only disposed in landfills, the
alleged environmental attribute actually produces no bene-
fit.
193
188 See supra note 17.
189 See NATIONAL ADVERTISING, supra note 12, at 93-94 ("By this view, truth is irrele-
vant. Instead, to promote the choice the regulator believes desirable, information is sup-
pressed concerning the issue most consumers confront regularly . . . . Until scientific
issues are definitively resolved, consumers are not to be trusted with the information.").
190 This is an outcome facilitated by the Court's questionable distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech. However, it is one widely disfavored by most
scholars of free speech. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
191 See, e.g., GREEN REPORT II, supra note 14, at 11. The Task Force would prohibit
any claims based on life-cycle analysis in light of the uncertainty inherent in such analy-
ses until "a general consensus is reached among government, business, environmental,
and consumer groups on how this type of environmental comparison can be advertised
non-deceptively." Id. It is unlikely such a consensus could ever develop.
192 For example, Edenfield stated that even solicitation, traditionally suspect and open
to abuse, may have considerable value. Edenfild, 113 S. Ct. at 1797. See also supra notes
42-43.
193 Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747, 758.
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But limiting the use of terms through definitions or certification
programs194 arguably makes active environmental consumers pas-
sive observers:
The consequences of simple yes/no purchase symbols [or
definitional constraints on the use of words] will be a net loss
for the environment. The effectiveness of these [programs] in
modifying consumer behavior is unclear, but they could pre-
vent beneficial actions by easing consumer guilt instead of
helping to change consumer habits. [For example], many peo-
ple seem unwilling to commit to long-term, community-wide
participation in the labor-intensive process of separating
recyclables and diverting organic waste to composing ....
Environmental 'involvement,' then, is the goal of those working
to reach consumers with positive messages about source reduc-
tion, recycling, and composting. If the consumer merely thinks,
'I did my job at the grocery store,' or 'my purchase of appro-
priately [defined] products fulfills my obligation to the environ--
ment,' the consumer has been induced to ignore the" real ac-
tions which most benefit the environment. 95
The point is not merely to critique California's policy as failing to
achieve environmental improvement. Rather, it demonstrates that
censorship of information is not the least restrictive way California
can improve its environment. Discovery Network demands such pre-
cise regulation when states attempt to limit commercial speech.
In Discovery Network, Cincinnati failed to satisfy the final two
prongs of the Central Hudson test because no commercial harm
existed.19 In applying this test, the Court suggested alternative
methods Cincinnati could have used to achieve its objective.
1 97
Although the Court refused to acknowledge that it was
reinstituting a least restrictive means test, it held that obvious
alternatives to the chosen policy are "relevant consideration[s] in
determining" whether a reasonable fit exists."9 ' Consistent with
194 See, e.g., Rathe, supra note 13, at 443-45 (discussing New Jersey and New York em-
blem statutes). Although utilizing a different method, these programs arguably have the
same effect on consumer behavior as the California law.
195 O'Reilly, supra note 178, at 209-11.
196 Discovey Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1514-15. Rehnquist correctly notes in dissent, how-
ever, that the majority does not discuss the third prong of the test. Id. at 1522. Instead,
the majority speaks of the law bearing "no relationship whatsoever" to its objective and
the failure to establish a "'fit' between means and ends." See id. at 1514, 1516.
197 Id. at 1510.
198 Id. at 1510 n.13. .Rehnquist disagreed: "[T]his argument rests on the discredited
notion that the availability of 'least restrictive means' to accomplish the city's objectives
1994]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the Court's reassertion of commercial speech value is a more ag-
gressive application of the Central Hudson test-an application
difficult to distinguish from Central Hudson's original requirement
that regulations be "not more extensive than ... necessary."199
California's statute runs afoul of this mandate.
For example, California's decision to prohibit a company from
informing a buyer that its product is 'biodegradable if composted'
restricts valuable information when it is not necessary. A less re-
strictive manner of accomplishing the same result would require
companies to inform consumers that their product is usually dis-
posed of in landfills. This provides the consumer an incentive
which censorship denies: It encourages composting, or other pro-
environmental activities. The same analysis applies to terms like
"recyclable":
[B]ecause the claim that a product is 'recyclable' is a claim
about capability rather than likelihood or actuality, such claims
should be permissible in some instances even when facilities
are not widely available .... [A]ctual recycling requires both
collection points and the consumer's ability to identify recycla-
ble products for separation and collection. Claims of recycla-
bility are likely to precede wide availability of facilities, because
little incentive exists to develop facilities in the absence of information
in the hands of the consumers.'
Discovery Network and Edenfield suggest that this is the approach
contemplated by the First Amendment. Again, information is not
renders its regulation of commercial speech unconstitutional." Id. at 1523 (citing Fox, 492
U.S. at 479).
199 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Thus, the Court has appeared to implicitly return
to a test akin to the least restrictive means test. Lower courts have recognized this shift
and acted accordingly. See, e.g., 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 555
(D.RI. 1993). Citing Discovey Network, the court stated that "[w]hile it may have been
'reasonable' or 'rational' . . . for the legislature to assume a correlation between the
price advertising ban and reduced consumption, the Supreme Court has recently ex-
plained that such 'rational basis' scrutiny is not to be applied when deciding the consti-
tutionality of restrictions on commercial speech . . . ." The court in fact describes the
fourth prong of Central Hudson as being satisfied when the contested regulation is "no
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." Id.
See also Kentucky Div., Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Turfway Park
Racing, 832 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Ky. 1993). In that case, a horsemen's organization chal-
lenged the Interstate Horseracing Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (1988)), which required
consent from horsemen's organizations and state agencies for interstate simulcasts of
horse races. The court struck down the Act as a violation of the commercial speech
doctrine. Relying on both Edenfield and Discovery Network, the court understood that com-
mercial speech "receives substantial protection . . . ." Id. at 1101 & nn.6-7.
200 NATIONAL ADVERTISING, supra note 12, at 109 (emphasis added).
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harmful, so companies should provide more, not less. California
may prefer to evaluate what environmental facts are valuable, but
the First Amendment's general rule "is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented."201 Therefore, a state cannot justify environmental reg-
ulations by arguing that they improve the environment.
B. Applying Central Hudson to the Government's Interest in
Preventing Deceptive Advertising
Unlike its interest in improving the environment, a state may
satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson by arguing that environ-
mental regulations level the playing field for businesses and con-
sumers, thereby reducing consumer deception.0 2 However, such
statutes are not sufficiently tailored to achieve this goal under
Central Hudson's fourth prong. It is clear that environmental ad-
vertisements are at least potentially misleading, presenting a com-
mercial harm that may be regulated.23 However, this statute
seeks to prevent deceptive claims by prohibiting the use of words
before they can be misused. It assumes first that consumers have
difficulty determining the truth of a claim; that by prohibiting the
use of a term except under specific conditions, consumers cannot
misunderstand how the term is used. Therefore, California's stat-
ute is prophylactic: It prescribes the use of a word like
"biodegradable" regardless of whether that word misleads anyone
201 Edenfield 113 S. CL at 1798 (emphasis added). See also supra note 141. The point
is further buttressed by Virginia Pharmanuy preference that private decisions should allo-
cate resources, not public ones. See supra note 43.
202 But even the GREEN REPORT admits that "[flor definitions and standards to be
truly effective in fostering truthful environmental advertising, they must be based on a
thorough understanding of the scientific and technical issues underlying existing and
emerging products as well as changes taking place in waste management." GREEN REPORT,
supra note 15, at 30. In light of Edenfiekds requirement that States give empirical evidence
to satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson, litigants would be well advised to argue,
utilizing current scientific evidence, that the State's statutory definitions misinterpret the
necessary scientific background and in fact do not promote truthful advertisements "to a
material degree."
203 See GREEN REPORT, supra note 15, at 15. See also Discoveiy Network, 113 S. Ct at
1515.
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in a given context °4 So, for example, California would prohibit
the following label:
The body of this can is steel. This material is recyclable where





This label does not present the harm California is trying to reme-
dy: It does not deceive. Instead, it bans truthful speech in an
effort to protect consumers from fraud yet to occur.
The principles established by Edenfield and thirteen years of
legal advertising cases discourage this approach. First, these cases
inform legislatures that prophylactic rules are subject to one test:
can the state achieve truthful advertising through less drastic mea-
sures? 26 This preference for disclosure would require a law man-
dating that businesses provide additional information to cure any
possibility of deception.0 7 Second, Edenfield also focused on the
coercive potential or context of the advertisement. 8 Similarly,
the legal advertising cases emphasize the unique context and cir-
cumstances of lawyer solicitations, distinguishing them from prod-
uct labeling.21 If prophylactic rules were disfavored by the Court
in professional solicitations, an area where abuse is difficult to
uncover, bans on publicly displayed products will certainly be suspect.
204 California's statute does allow the use of these words under specified conditions.
However, because the statute seeks to prevent harms before they occur, the rule is pro-
phylactic. See supra note 68. This prior restraint on speech is disfavored, regardless of
whether some speech is allowed. See supra note 145. Of course, complete bans on the
use of terms in any circumstance would also be suspect, but the Court's scrutiny does
not diminish simply because a prescription on the use of words does not entirely prevent
theii use. Therefore, the principles derived from the Court's opinions on legal advertising
are not inapposite because they concerned complete bans. Instead, they speak directly to
environmental advertising because they were prior restraints on speech in a context more
amendable to abuse than is product labeling. See supra notes 66-68.
205 See NATIONAL ADVERTISING, supra note 12, at 110 (citing Complaint at 22, Associa-
tion of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1992)). This
would be prohibited by the statute because it requires that the product be recyclable in
every county of California with a population of 300,000 or more. See CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17508.5(d) (West Supp. 1994).
206 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. But see the Lungren decision's defer-
ence to the legislature: "The California legislature decided that allowing manufacturers
and distributors to evade the dictates of [the law] by defining terms themselves would
not promote the state's consumer and environmental protection goals . . . [Sluch a
policy determination is reasonable in light of Fox . . . ." Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 758.
The Court's 1993 opinions would not accord regulators this level of deference.
207 See supra notes 48, 63-65.
208 See supra note 139.
209 See supra notes *66-68.
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While Edenfield and the legal advertising cases are directly
analogous to environmental labeling and their potential to de-
ceive, Discovery Network must also inform a court's analysis. Com-
mercial information can always be misused by businesses, and
environmental information is no exception, especially in light of
the scientific debates surrounding the field.21° The crucial issue is
how courts should handle the misuse of information under the
First Amendment. Discovery Network reformulates First Amendment
analysis by shifting the focus from the nature of the speech (com-
mercial v. noncommercial) to the harms resulting therefrom.21'
When these harms arise, the First Amendment's preferred remedy
is more information.212 Therefore, apart from the application of
the Central Hudson factors, states regulating environmental terms
have an uphill climb if Discovery Network is to be given any
precedential force. While states seek to constrain knowledge, Dis-
covery Network hopes to free information. Under these principles,
the potential for deception in environmental advertisements can-
not justify such regulations under the fourth prong of Central
Hudson.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurispru-
dence is best described as a minefield where unsuspecting litigants
attempting to apply the Court's precedents find themselves victim-
ized by a newly discovered factor or condition unique to "this
kind" of advertising. Discrepancies still exist, perhaps due to the
Court's decision to retain the commercial speech definition as an
analytical tool under the First Amendment. Indeed, it has been
argued that "[a]s long as the commercial speech doctrine includes
such a strong subjective component, judicial rulings may often
turn on judicial views of the value of different types of commercial
speech."2 " The advent of Justice Ginsburg's tenure on the Court
adds yet" another variable to this complex equation. 4 Further-
210 See supra notes 11321, 175-78 and accompanying text.
211 See supra Part IV.A.1.
212 See supra notes 45-48.
213 David 0. Stewart, Commercial Break: Supreme Court Bolsters Constitutional Protection for
Commercial Speech, 79 A.BA. J. 42, 45 (1993).
214 Justice Ginsburg has made no prominent commercial speech rulings. However,
some see her as an ardent First Amendment supporter and a strong ally of commercial
speech protection. See Steven W. Colford, High Court Hopeful Seen as Advertisement Ally, AD-
VERTISING AGE, June 21, 1993, at 48.
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more, environmental advertising regulations present a new array of
facts, and nothing prevents the Court from reformulating its analy-
sis again in light of "the differing natures, values, abuses and dan-
gers of [this method of advertising]."25
However, the 1993 Court has made some sense of this diffi-
cult area. Operating against three factual backgrounds, a majority
of the Court emphasized principles of First Amendment law that
are not confined to particular types of advertising: Information is
valuable to free people; harmful speech should be remedied by
more speech, not less; and individuals, not governments, should be
permitted to make these informed decisions. Ultimately, states
regulating the ability to speak about true environmental attributes
of their products or services find themselves at war with these
undergirding principles. And "a law repugnant to the Constitution
is void."" 6
Peter J. Tarsney"
215 Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)).
Thus, the Ninth Circuit, in Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.
1993), evaluated billboard regulations under the commercial speech doctrine by chosing
to "pay particular attention to the body of case law involving billboard regulations. For as
the Supreme Court has often recognized, 'each method of communicating ideas is a 'law
unto itself. . . . '" Id. at 610.
So, for instance, the Court could conceivably find that environmental attributes are
so inherently misleading as to be beyond the purview of First Amendment protection.
216 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
* The author would like to thank Professor Douglas Kmiec and Ms. Lucy Payne for
their support and guidance in the preparation of this Note.
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